Six years of the Centralized Partnership Audit Regime have elucidated a central understanding: the Bipartisan Budget Act provisions present plenty of potential pitfalls for partnerships, partnership representatives and the partners. The BBA creates a fictitious partnership level tax, imbues the partnership representative with authoritarian control, threatens to create conflict between partners, and overhauls the partnership examination requiring key decisions at various stages of the examination process.
BBA examination overview
BBA examinations begin with a Notice of Administrative Proceeding, which is sent only to the partnership representative, who is appointed by the partnership on a timely filed original return for each tax year and charged with the responsibility of representing the partnership in matters involving the Internal Revenue Service. (The partnership representative does not have to be a partner and can be an entity. In the context of an entity representative, the partnership must appoint a representative of the entity — a designated individual — as the point of contact for the IRS.)
Then the IRS will issue a Notice of Preliminary Partnership Examination Changes that gives the PR the ability to raise any disputes with the proposed changes with the IRS Office of Appeals. Next, the IRS will issue a Notice of Proposed Partnership Adjustment. The NOPPA asserts a fictitious partnership-level tax called the imputed underpayment and starts a 270-day clock during which the partnership, working with the individual partners, can request a modification of the imputed underpayment. After the close of that period, the IRS will issue a Final Partnership Adjustment (FPA) that asserts an imputed underpayment (less any adjustments for modifications) and penalties, if applicable. The FPA also starts both a 45-day clock for making a push-out election and a 90-day clock for filing a suit to challenge the IRS determinations. Only the PR acting on behalf of the partnership can bring an action and may do so in the Tax Court or, after making a deposit of the imputed underpayment, penalties, additions to tax and additional amounts, through the U.S. District Court or Court of Federal Claims.
There are a number of pitfalls in the BBA process, but perhaps the most important are those associated with the PR, which replaced the prior tax matters partner (TMP) under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) partnership regime.
TMP versus PR
Under TEFRA, the TMP, as representative of the partnership, could only bind the non-notice partners, leaving notice partners with options to fight — even to the point of litigation — on their own. A notice partner was any partner in a partnership with 100 or fewer partners. For partnerships larger than that, notice partners were any partners owning 1% or more of the partnership. Partners who owned less than 1% could form a notice group that collectively owned 5% of the partnership (notice group) to obtain notice partner rights.
Under TEFRA, notice partners could file a petition with the U.S. Tax Court if the TMP failed to bring such an action, intervene in any Tax Court settlement, pay their share of any flow-through adjustments, and file a claim for refund (and suit for refund). Notice partners were not inherently bound by the decisions of the TMP.
Pitfall 1: The BBA regime eliminates that individualism, imbuing the PR with complete control over the partnership. Under the BBA, notice partners are no more; only the partnership representative can bring a court action, and no partner has a right to intervene in a settlement or litigation. Individual partners no longer have the ability to pay their share and file a suit for refund. The partnership representative has complete authority to bind the partnership, exposing the partnership and the partners.
Modifications: An opportunity for individualism
The modification process offers a glimpse at TEFRA-era individualism. During the 270-day post-NOPPA period, an individual partner can request a modification by filing amended returns for the tax year under audit (and any other affected tax years) to account for their share of the partnership adjustments. The partner must also pay all taxes, penalties and interest associated with the amendments. Once a modification has been made, the imputed underpayment at the partnership level is reduced by the amount allocated to the individual partner. However, the individual partner cannot later file a second amended return to undo the adjustments until or unless a court determines that the partnership-level adjustments were incorrect.
For partnerships, modifications make sense if there is no defense to the adjustments raised by the NOPPA, the modification reduces the effective tax owed by the partners for those that are tax-exempt entities or the long-term strategy involves filing an action in the District Court or Court of Federal Claims. Modifications may help reduce the amount the partnership has to pay to file an action in those courts. For partners that do not trust the PR, this could be the first point of dissension from the partnership because partnerships and partners must work together to facilitate a modification.
Push-out elections
During the 45-day period starting with the issuance of the FPA, the partnership may elect to push out the partnership adjustments to its partners. Push-out elections push the adjustments to the individual partners on a pro-rata basis. Unlike modifications, push-outs do not require consent from the individual partners.
Push-outs can be beneficial if individual partners have tax attributes that would lower the effective tax rate. For example, for an individual partner with large capital gains or loss carryovers, the adjustment may have a lower tax impact than the maximum individual default rate of 37%. Push-out elections may also be beneficial to partnerships with a large number of disassociated partners. Otherwise, the partnership as a whole is on the hook for the imputed underpayment and may lack the funds to cover that tax, forcing a capital call that may produce mixed results.
Pitfall 2: Push-out elections require an intensive process that carries administrative burdens. If any mistakes are made in that process, the IRS can void the election.
Pitfall 3: If the partnership elects to push out the adjustments, the IRS will increase interest on any balance by an additional 2% over the going rates. This could result in increased exposure for the partner.
Pitfall 4: The individual allocations and additional interest could cause inconsistent results among partners. Unlike modifications, push-outs affect every partner. Situations may arise where a push-out helps a partner with a lower effective tax rate but increases out-of-pocket costs for a partner at a 37% effective rate that now has to contend with 2% additional interest.
Pitfall 5: Push-out elections shift responsibility for the adjustment to the partners that make up the partnership in the adjustment year, which is defined as the year in which the adjustment is finalized (the year the FPA is accepted or the year a court decision becomes final). This creates a situation where a partner in the partnership during the year under audit subsequently sells its partnership interest to another taxpayer and avoids liability while sticking the new partner with a liability from a year when they were not even a partner, creating a disconnect between benefits and burdens associated with the adjustments.
This means that each partnership needs to think about the administrative burdens of trying to collect contributions from each partner to pay the tax, the likelihood of a push-out reducing the collective tax by amounts sufficient to offset the additional 2% interest and the possibility that some partners will be worse off with such a decision while others benefit.
